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ABSTRACT
In recent years, there has been a rising concern about the policy of major search engines. The concern comes from search 
bias, which refers to the ranking of the results of a keyword search on the basis of some other principle than the sheer 
relevance. This search bias is also named search non-neutrality. In this paper, we analyze one non-neutral behavior, that is, 
a behavior that results in a search bias: the payment by content providers to the search engine (aka. side payment) in order 
to improve the chances to be located and accessed by a user. A game theory-based model is presented where a search engine 
and two content providers interact strategically, while the aggregated behavior of users is modeled by a demand function. 
The utility of each stakeholder (i.e., the users, the search engine, and each content provider) when the search engine is 
engaged in such a non-neutral behavior is compared with that of the neutral case, when no such side payment is present. 
Additionally, the paper analyzes the organization of such an industry, specifically, the search engine and content providers 
incentives for a partial and full merger with the content providers, and the effects of each organization on the users. This 
paper concludes by identifying the circumstances under which the search bias, on the one hand, and the integration, on 
the other, will effectively result in the users being harmed. This eventual harmful situation will provide a rationale for 
regulatory measures to be adopted.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been an increasing concern
about Google policy, in terms of its search activities,
implying the eventuality that this role should be regulated
by government authorities. This is the aim of “search
engine neutrality” advocates. The concern is about search
engine bias, a term used to describe the activities of a
search engine exercising its editorial discretion in a manner
that advantages its own or affiliated content, which could
favor some content wishing to pay to be better ranked,
or which could disadvantage rivals. Search bias therefore
refers to rankings based on some principle other than
automated relevance for users. Within this paper, we focus
on this concern, shown by some regulators on those search
rankings that benefit the host search engine: for example
the European Commission justified its inquiry into Google
by a need to investigate if there is a conduct potentially
“lowering the ranking of unpaid results” relatively to paid
advertisements even in the regular, also called organic,
results, as opposed to the sponsored links clearly declared
(and presented as such to users) to make money [1].
Search neutrality advocates need, however, to demon-
strate that there is a problem necessitating any of the
various prescribed remedies, such as the application of
standard merger analysis under the antitrust laws and even
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the creation of a government-sponsored “public option” for
searches [2].
Problems cited by search neutrality advocates may be
broadly classified in two groups: competition law and
antitrust problems arising from “non-objective” search
results, and social and cultural issues arising from the use
that consumers may make with “non-objective” results.
This paper is focused on the former group.
As regards the potential competitive harm from search
bias, one argument is based on the “essential facilities”
doctrine [3] and stresses that popular search engines,
Google for instance, act as a “bottleneck” to access of
websites by consumers. By using its power to determine
which end websites are reached or not, a search engine can
effectively exclude nascent websites from both advertising
and sales revenue. Another, but related, argument claims
that a search engine disadvantages its content rivals by
raising their (awareness) costs relatively to its own. By
directing search traffic to its own products—e.g., its mail,
calendar, and marketplace platforms—a search engine
would effectively discriminate against rivals and force
those rivals into more expensive substitute distributions
channels [4]. The question remains whether a search
engine’s use of its search algorithm to direct traffic to itself
harms competition and consumers [5].
This paper aims to shed light on the issue of the search
bias. Specifically, it focuses on the analysis of the harm
that an apparently non-neutral behavior by a search engine
may have on content providers and users. The non-neutral
behavior we specifically consider here consists in charging
a side payment to the content providers in exchange for
better search results. Additionally, the paper analyzes the
organization of such an industry, specifically, the search
engine and content providers incentives for partial and
full integration. While the issue of network neutrality
has recently been the topic of a very active debate and
extensive literature (see [6] and references herein), this
paper is to our knowledge one of the few ones dealing
with a mathematical modeling and analysis of search
neutrality, though this issue may be critical as we have just
highlighted above.
Note that we have defined search neutrality by drawing
parallelisms with the definition of network neutrality. Net
neutrality means that Internet Service providers (ISPs)
should charge consumers only once for Internet access,
should not favor one content provider over another,
and should not charge content providers serviced by
competitors for sending information over broadband lines
to end users—no matter how much bandwidth that content
uses [7]. The debate around net neutrality arose when
ISPs complained that major content providers had their
traffic flowing through ISP networks—which was resource
consuming—but were only paying an access fee to their
servicing ISPs. ISPs then threatened to ask side payments
to content providers [8]. In a similar fashion, as motivated
in the previous paragraphs and for the purposes of our
analysis, we define search neutrality as the provision of a
search service to the users where the search engine does
not request any side payment from the content providers.
This paper is structured as follows. Next section
describes the scenario to be modeled and presents the
details of the baseline (neutral) model, which comprises
a search engine without a search bias, and analyzes the
corresponding pricing optimization problem of two pay-
per-use content providers. Section 3 models the case where
the search engine exhibits a search bias, and computes the
related equilibrium of the non-cooperative game played
with each content provider. Section 4 compares the outputs
obtained in both cases, neutral and non-neutral. Section 5
analyzes the incentives that the search engine and the
content providers may have to integrate, and whether an
integration is harmful for the users. Section 6 presents
numerical results that are represented graphically and
discussed in order to gain insight in the different trade-offs
at stake. Section 7 presents an alternative model where the
search engine post its price before each content provider
does, and it discusses the differences between the models.
And finally, some conclusions are drawn in Section 8.
1.1. Related work
Game theory was originally applied to the analysis of the
interaction between economic agents, but more recently
has extended towards the interaction between any kind
of agents, specifically communications agents. This is the
approach of the analysis and design of spectrum sharing
[9] and rate adaptation [10] mechanisms in wireless radio
networks. Furthermore, there are works that provide a
mixed approach whereby both technical and economical
decisions are modeled through game theory [11].
Our approach relates back to the analysis of the
economical interactions. The analysis presented in this
paper is in fact closely related to previous works on game
2
L. Guijarro et al. Search engine and content providers: neutrality, competition and integration
theory-based models of network neutrality. Reference [12]
studies the implications of two types of non-neutral
behavior by a monopolistic ISP: charging side payments
and multiple service classes provision. Reference [13]
analyzes the case of two competitive ISPs and a single
content provider, specifically the incentive that each ISP
has in charging a side payment. Our work focuses also on
the issue of side payment—charged by the search engine,
instead of the ISP. However, departing from [13], in our
work the search engine faces no competition from other
search engines, while the content providers do. And, as
we will see in the body of the paper, the search engine
modifies the service that content providers receive when
a side payment is charged, which is not the case in the
network neutrality analysis in [12].
Our paper is to our knowledge one of the few ones
dealing with a game-theory modeling and analysis of
search neutrality. Reference [14] also addresses this
research question. However, it focuses on the issue of
content ranking—while our focus, as stated above, is on
the issue of the side payment. Specifically, reference [14]
compares different ranking behaviors of a search engine.
In a neutral ranking, content is ranked based only on its
relevance. The paper demonstrates, by means of specific
examples, the incentives for the search engine to depart
from this neutral behavior in two ways: a first one where
the search engine gets a fraction of the add-generated
revenue of the ranked content, and a second one where the
search engine owns some of the ranked content.
Finally, there are other infomedation scenarios that are
receiving increasing interest in the scientific community.
As an example, a news aggregator may increase a reader’s
propensity to visit the content producer’s site, but it may
also deprive the latter of traffic that would otherwise
flow to their sites [15]. Some conclusions and modeling
elements might be reused across this scenario and our
scenario—actually, Google plays a predominant role both
as a search engine and as a news aggregator.
2. GENERAL MODEL AND ANALYSIS
OF THE NEUTRAL CASE
The scenario modeled in this paper is shown in Fig. 1. It
includes:
Users
Search
Engine
Content
Provider 1
Content
Provider 2
p1
p2
q
q
Figure 1. General model
• The users, who typically access the content stored
at the content providers by using the search engine
services.
• Two content providers (CP), which compete in
providing paid content to the users, at prices pi(i =
1, 2).
• The search engine (SE), which helps the users in
locating the content at the content providers, and in
the non-neutral case charges a price q to each CP.
Arrows represent money flows, and are labeled by the
corresponding unit price.
In this section, we model the case where there is no side
payment from the CPs to the SE, that is, where q = 0 in
Fig. 1. We take this case as the baseline model, so that the
search engine non-neutral behavior will be compared with
this benchmark/baseline model.
The model builds on a previous contribution by the same
authors, where a simpler game model was analyzed [16].
The model only covered the interaction between one
SE and one CP, providing a first approximation to the
modeling of a side payment as a non-neutral behavior of a
SE. By incorporating the competition between two content
providers, this paper not only analyzes a more realistic
model comprising an upstream monopoly (the SE) and a
dowstream oligopoly (the two CPs), but in addition the
extended model allows to analyze the richer relationships
between the SE and each CP or both, as section 5 will
show.
2.1. Users
We model the user preferences by means of a repre-
sentative user who maximizes U(x1, x2)− p1x1 − p2x2,
where xi is the amount of content demanded from CPi and
pi is the price charged by CPi. The function U is assumed
3
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to be quadratic and strictly concave:
U(x1, x2) = α1x1 + α2x2 − (β1x21 + 2γx1x2 + β2x22)/2
(1)
This expression is canonical in microeconomics for
modeling the demand of differentiated products in a
duopoly [17]. It is widely used in modeling user behavior
for the following reasons. First, as it is shown below
in (5), it produces the simplest downwards-sloping demand
function, i.e. a linear one. Second, it models the demand
for products supplied by two competing producers, where
the products are not homogeneous; specifically, we assume
here that γ > 0, so that the products are substitutable, that
is, a price increase in one product causes an increase in the
demand of the other one—we will also contemplate that
γ = 0, so that the products are independent. The contents
supplied by each provider are effectively substitutable
goods. And third, it allows the model to abstract from
the specific mechanisms that influence the behavior
of the users, and to focus on other aspects, like the
pricing and side payment of the content providers. The
above expression for the utility has been widely used in
telecommunications economics; see, for instance, how it
has been used for modeling users demand for spectrum
offered by oligopolistic wireless service providers in [18]
and [19].
The above function can be expressed in matrix form as
U(x) = α′x− 1
2
x′Mx, (2)
wherex = [x1 x2]′, andα = [α1 α2]′ are column vectors,
and
M =
[
β1 γ
γ β2
]
,
with αi, βi, β1β2 − γ2, αiβj − αjγ > 0, when i, j =
1, 2, j 6= i. These conditions ensure that the utility
function is strictly concave, its global maximum is
attained at a point of positive demands, and the utility is
positive around the point of zero demands, x1 = x2 = 0.
We assume that the services provided by the CPs are
substitutes or independent, so that γ ≥ 0.
This utility function gives rise to a demand given by
x = arg max
a
[
U(a)− p′a] , (3)
where p = [p1 p2]′, which yields a linear dependence
p = α−Mx, and (4)
x = M−1(α− p), (5)
provided that quantities and prices are positive. We see
that, first, x1 (resp. x2) is linearly decreasing in p1 (resp.
p2) and linearly increasing in p2 (resp. p1); and second, the
demand functions have the properties of symmetry of cross
effects, that is,
∂xi
∂pj
=
∂xj
∂pi
. (6)
In words, the cross effect of a price rise of one service on
the demand of the other one is the same as the reciprocal
effect.
We can alternatively interpret the demand functions
x1 = D1(p1, p2) and x2 = D2(p1, p2) as the total amount
of users subscribing to each CP, where p1 (resp. p2) would
be the price charged by content provider 1 (resp. 2). We
propose that
D1(p1, p2) = η0(D01 − d1p1 + cp2), (7)
D2(p1, p2) = η0(D02 − d2p2 + cp1), (8)
D(p1, p2) = D1(p1, p2) +D2(p1, p2), (9)
where η0 denotes the probability (0 < η0 < 1) that the
content is located by the search engine and therefore
accessed by a user. D0i is the maximum potential level of
demand from content provider i, if all content was for free,
and provided it was fully advertised by the search engine
(η0 = 1). And c is the same coefficient in both expressions
due to the symmetry of cross effects. We assume that
pi has a effect on the demand Di which is stronger than
the cross effect produced produced by pj , j 6= i; hence,
di > c, which implies that d1d2 > c2. Note that the latter
condition can be shown to be equivalent to β1β2 − γ2 > 0
that was stated above.
The value of D0i − dipi + cpj can be interpreted as
(being proportional to) the probability that a user, given
the fact that he has “found” the content, actually subscribes
to its service. That decision depends on the prices pi and
pj set by the content providers, but also on the user’s
willingness-to-pay for the service.
The relationship between the two sets of parameters
used to describe the demand is derived in Appendix A.1.
4
L. Guijarro et al. Search engine and content providers: neutrality, competition and integration
Eqs. (7)–(8) can be rewritten in matrix form as[
D1
D2
]
= η0
([
D01
D02
]
− S
[
p1
p2
])
(10)
where
S =
[
d1 −c
−c d2
]
. (11)
2.2. Content providers
We assume, as described in Fig. 1, that CP i charges a
fixed price pi to the users. In the baseline model the CPs
are assumed not to incur costs, so that the CPs’ profits are
given by:
Πc,i(p1, p2) = piDi, i = 1, 2, (12)
Again, we assume that every piece of content that the users
would like to access is stored by both content providers.
However, the content will be located by the users by
using the service of the search engine, which means that
there is content stored at the CP which may end up not
being accessed by the users if the search engine denies
mentioning it.
2.3. Search engine
The role of the SE is to “help” users reach the content that
is relevant to them.
We assume in our baseline model that the SE does
not charge any usage-based price to the CPs. However,
there is an additional revenue coming from sponsored
links (displayed usually at the top and/or at the right of
the regular/organic links), and which can reasonably be
assumed to be proportional to the demand level. Indeed,
users subscribing to a CP can be seen from the SE point of
view as “satisfied” by the SE results, hence more likely to
use that SE again and yield revenues through the sponsored
links. Thus,
Πs = λ ·D (13)
with λ > 0 the coefficient giving the revenue per
subscriber to the CPs’ service, coming from sponsored
links. Therefore in the baseline model more demand at the
CP level will give more revenue to the SE.
2.4. Solution
Given that the parameters D0i, η0, di, c and λ are fixed,
the only decision variables in this baseline model are the
CPs’ prices pi. Each CP will charge a price p(n)i so as to
maximize its profits Πc,i. The analysis framework is that
of non-cooperative game theory [20], and the equilibrium
concept that of Nash equilibrium, which is a strategy
profile (p(n)1 , p
(n)
2 ) such that no player can unilaterally
increase its profits through a price change.
Since the profit functions of the CPs (Πc,i) are clearly
concave and continuously differentiable, the equilibrium
is reached when the first order conditions (FOCs)
∂Πc,1
∂p1
= η0(D01 − 2d1p1 + cp2) = 0, (14)
∂Πc,2
∂p2
= η0(D02 − 2d2p2 + cp1) = 0 (15)
are simultaneously fulfilled, giving as solutions[
p(n)1
p(n)2
]
= R
[
D01
D02
]
(16)
where
R =
[
2d1 −c
−c 2d2
]−1
. (17)
Now, we define D(n)i = Di(p
(n)
1 , p
(n)
2 ), D
(n) =
D(p(n)1 , p
(n)
2 ), Π
(n)
c,i = Πc,i(p
(n)
1 , p
(n)
2 ), Π
(n)
s = Πs(p
(n)
1 , p
(n)
2 ).
After some algebra we obtain:
D
(n)
i = η0dip
(n)
i , (18)
Π(n)c,i = p
(n)
i D
(n)
i =
(
D
(n)
i
)2
/(η0di), (19)
Π(n)s = λ
(
D
(n)
1 +D
(n)
2
)
. (20)
3. NON-NEUTRAL MODEL
The neutral case being solved, we now focus on the non-
neutral behavior of a SE implementing side payments q
from each CP to the SE. The effect of the side payment is
two-fold:
• Paying q to the SE will increase the chances that
CPi’s content is located and accessed by the users,
when users decide to use the SE. We model this
effect through an increasing function η1(q).
5
Search engine and content providers: neutrality, competition and integration L. Guijarro et al.
• The more the SE charges to the CP, the less the users
trust the search results because the search bias will
increase and the reputation of the SE will decrease,
and the less likely they will use the SE. We model
this reputation effect through a decreasing function
η2(q).
As a consequence, the overall probability η0 that a CP
is seen by a user in the baseline model is proposed to be
replaced here by a function
η(q) = η1(q)η2(q). (21)
taking into account the positive and negative consequences
of side payments commented above.
We will also assume
η(0) = η0 (22)
so that a CP not paying any charge to the SE will
reasonably be such that the model comes down to the
baseline/neutral case. In the non-neutral case though, the
SE could play with η1 to impose η(0) < η0 to enforce the
CP to pay. This (other) case is left for further research; but
would not add any major change to the analysis.
Taking into account the side payment, the demand
functions Di and the profits Πc,i and Πs are now given
by: [
D1
D2
]
= η(q)
([
D01
D02
]
− S
[
p1
p2
])
(23)
Πc,i(p1, p2, q) = (pi − q)Di, i = 1, 2, (24)
Πs(p1, p2, q) = (q + λ)(D1 +D2). (25)
Note that these expressions generalize (10),(12), and (13).
And that we also assume that the cross effects in D1 and
D2 are symmetric, as stated in (6) for the neutral model.
The relationship between the two sets of parameters
used to describe the demand for the non-neutral model is
derived in Appendix A.2.
Some remarks follow with respect to the purpose and
the scope of the non-neutral model presented in this
section:
• The SE departs from the neutral behavior described
in the previous section insofar as it modulates the
content demand function by a function η which
is not only dependent on an objective ranking
algorithm—as in the neutral case, but also on a side
payment q.
• The side payment is assumed to be a tax levied by
the SE in a non-discriminatory manner. Therefore,
the SE is not assumed to play with a discriminatory
qi in order to drive demand from one CP to the
other one. In a similar fashion, no CP is assumed
to choose a qi in order to drive demand from the
competing CP.
• The function η(·) therefore influences the overall
demand faced by the two CPs. It aims to model
a potential dead weight loss that the side payment
may cause on the welfare of the operators and of the
users. An interpretation may be that a low η value
would drive demand out from the CPs, while a high
η would drive demand back to the CPs.
3.1. Solution
Given η(·) and the parameters D0i, di, c and λ, each of
the two CPs and the SE interact strategically and non-
cooperatively in order to maximize their respective profits.
That is, each CP will charge a price pi so as to maximize
its profits Πc,i, and simultaneously the SE will charge a
side payment q so as to maximize its profits Πs. Again, we
search for a Nash equilibrium (p(nn)1 , p
(nn)
2 , q
∗). Although
we assume that prices are chosen simultaneously, what
is relevant for the analysis is not the timing of the
decisions but the fact that each player makes its choice
without the knowledge of the other players’ choices.
The simultaneous-move assumption is commonplace in
economic modeling, however an alternative assumption
will be discussed in Section 7.
Again, since the profit functions of the CPs (Πc,i) are
concave and continuously differentiable, we search the
equilibrium prices by solving the FOCs. Given a strategy q
of the SE, the FOCs can now be written as
η(q)
([ D01
D02
]
−R
[
p1
p2
]
+
[
d1
d2
]
q
)
= 0 (26)
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And for the SE, differentiating with respect to q and
equating to zero, we get
∂Πs
∂q
= (D01 − d1p1 + cp2 +D02 − d2p2 + cp1)
× (η(q) + η′(q)(q + λ)) = 0. (27)
We assume that either D01 − d1p1 + cp2 > 0 or D02 −
d2p2 + cp1 > 0, or both (otherwise the SE gets nothing).
Then, ∂Πs
∂q
is of the same sign as η(q) + η′(q)(q + λ).
Additionally, the solution to (27), q∗ > 0, should lead
to a better performance, in terms of probability for a CP
to be visited, with respect to the neutral case, so that the
non-neutral service is seen as an enhanced service for the
CP. That is,
η(q∗) ≥ η(0). (28)
We propose the following expressions for η1(q) and
η2(q):
η1(q) =
(
1− 1− η0
q + 1
)
(29)
η2(q) =
1
q + 1
. (30)
These expressions comply with the desired behavior and
assumptions, and they remain tractable in the analysis
that is conducted hereafter. Specifically, first, η1(q) is
increasing and η2(q) is decreasing. Second, the condition
in (22) is satisfied. And, third, the requirement (28) is met
as long as η0 < 1/2—taking into account the fact that
η1(q)η2(q) is decreasing when q > 1− 2η0. This may be
interpreted as requiring that the visibility of the content in
the neutral case be low enough.
Substituting (29) and (30) in (27), we get
q∗ =
η0 + λ(1− 2η0)
λ− 2 + η0 . (31)
Requirement (28) becomes
η(q∗) =
(λ− 2 + η0)(λ− λη0 − η0 + η20)
4(λ+ η0 − λη0 − 1)2
=
(λ− 2 + η0)(λ− η0)
4(1− η0)(λ− 1)2 > η0.
After some algebra and bearing in mind that η0 < 1/2, the
above inequality can be rewritten as
λ2 − 2λ− η0(2− 3η0)
(1− 2η0)2 > 0
which is satisfied if and only if
λ > 1 +
√
1 +
η0(2− 3η0)
(1− 2η0)2 = 2 +
η0
1− 2η0 . (32)
Analogously to the neutral case, p(nn)1 and p
(nn)
2 are the
solutions of the FOCs (26) in the non-neutral case[
p(nn)1
p(nn)2
]
= R
([ D01
D02
]
+
[
d1
d2
]
q
)
(33)
Likewise, we introduce D(nn)i = Di(p
(nn)
1 , p
(nn)
2 , q
∗),
D(nn) = D(p(nn)1 , p
(nn)
2 , q
∗), Π(nn)c,i = Πc,i(p
(nn)
1 , p
(nn)
2 , q
∗)
and Π(nn)s = Πs(p
(nn)
1 , p
(nn)
2 , q
∗). And we define
η∗ = η(q∗). After some algebra we obtain:
D(nn)1 = η
∗d1p
(n)
1
(
1− q∗ 2d1d2 − c
2 − cd2
2d2D01 + cD02
)
, (34)
D(nn)2 = η
∗d2p
(n)
2
(
1− q∗ 2d1d2 − c
2 − cd1
2d1D02 + cD01
)
, (35)
Π(n)c,i = (p
(n)
i − q∗)D(n)i =
(
D(nn)i
)2
/(η∗di), (36)
Π(nn)s = (q
∗ + λ)
(
D(nn)1 +D
(nn)
2
)
. (37)
It would remain to prove that, given (p(nn)1 , p
(nn)
2 ), q
∗ is a
maximum of Πs, which we do next. From (31) and (32) it
follows that q∗ > 0. Besides,
∂2Πs
∂q2
(p(nn)1 , p
(nn)
2 , q
∗) =
− 2D
(nn)
1 +D
(nn)
2
η∗
(1− ηo)(λ− 1)
(1 + q∗)4
< 0. (38)
Thus, we conclude that Πs reaches a global maximum at
q = q∗.
4. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE
NEUTRAL AND NON-NEUTRAL
CASES
In this section, the outcomes for the users, the CPs
and the SE in the non-neutral case is compared with
the baseline case, and constraints on the values of the
parameters providing better output thanks to non-neutrality
are derived.
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4.1. Profits
We first focus on the CPs profits Πc,i, and the SE
profits Πs. Dealing with (18)–(20) and with (34)–(37), the
following conditions are obtained:
Content providers:
Π(nn)c,1 > Π
(n)
c,1 ⇐⇒
2d2D01 + cD02
2d1d2 − c2 − cd2 >
q∗
1−
√
η0
η∗
(39)
Π(nn)c,2 > Π
(n)
c,2 ⇐⇒
2d1D02 + cD01
2d1d2 − c2 − cd1 >
q∗
1−
√
η0
η∗
(40)
Search engine:
Π(nn)s > Π
(n)
s ⇐⇒
d2(2d1 + c)D01 + d1(2d2 + c)D02
(d1 + d2)(2d1d2 − c2)− 2d1d2c >
q∗
1− λ
λ+q∗
η0
η∗
(41)
In the rest of the section, we will consider the case
in which both CPs have the same characteristics, so that
expressions would allow to gain an insight. Notation can
be simplified as d1 = d2 = d and D01 = D02 = D0. We
have checked that the non-symmetric case does not add
value to the conclusions.
For the neutral case,
p(n)i = p
(n) =
D0
2d− c , (42)
D
(n)
i = η0dp
(n), (43)
Π(n)c,i = Π
(n)
c =
(
D
(n)
i
)2
/(η0d), (44)
Π(n)s = 2λD
(n)
i . (45)
And for the non-neutral case,
p(nn)i = p
(nn) = p(n) +
dq∗
2d− c =
D0 + dq
∗
2d− c , (46)
D(nn)i = η
∗dp(n)
(
1− q∗ d− c
D0
)
, (47)
Π(nn)c,i = Π
(nn)
c = η
∗d(p(n))2
(
1− q∗ d− c
D0
)2
, (48)
Π(nn)s = 2(λ+ q
∗)D(nn)i . (49)
Thus, the conditions for improvement under non-neutral
behavior become the following ones:
Π(nn)c > Π
(n)
c ⇐⇒ C1 ≡ D0
d− c >
q∗
1−
√
η0
η∗
, (50)
Π(nn)s > Π
(n)
s ⇐⇒ C2 ≡ D0
d− c >
q∗
1− λ
λ+q∗
η0
η∗
.
(51)
On the minimum value of λ. In the following
paragraphs, we derive the restrictions that C1 imposes
on λ.
Note that the right-hand side of the inequality in C1 is
decreasing in λ. This follows from the two facts:
• η∗ is increasing in λ
η∗ =
(λ− 2 + η0)(λ− η0)
4(1− η0)(λ− 1)2
=
1
4(1− η0)
(
1− (1− η0)
2
(λ− 1)2
)
.
• q∗ is decreasing in λ
∂q∗
∂λ
=
−2(1− η0)2
(λ− 2 + η0)2 < 0 .
Therefore, for a given value of D0/(d− c), condition
C1 is equivalent to imposing a minimum value for
λ. Furthermore, the lower D0/(d− c), the higher that
minimum value will be. This may be interpreted as
requiring that the SE, in the absence of side payments,
get a minimum revenue from the user demand for content.
Conversely, for a given λ, C1 gives a lower bound for
D0/(d− c), and the higher λ, the less restrictive that lower
bound is. Likewise, this may be interpreted as requiring
that the users be willing to pay a minimum amount for the
service.
4.2. Consumer surplus
Another outcome to compare is the consumer surplus,
representing the aggregated value that users get from the
whole service. We compute the consumer surplus as [17]
[21]
CS(x) = U(x)− p′x, (52)
where again x = [D1 D2]′ is the column vector of
actual demands and p = [p1 p2]′ that of the prices. The
8
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consumer surplus (aka. Marshallian consumer surplus) at
the equilibrium price p is computed as the integral of
the demand curve between p and the price which sets
the demand to zero. When the expression of the utility
is of the quasilinear type, as it is our case (U(x1, x2)−
p1x1 − p2x2), the consumer surplus ends up being equal
to the value of the utility at the optimum quantities, and
it gives a money-metric utility measure at these quantities.
As such, the consumer surplus is an equivalent measure to
the producer’s profit.
Eq. (52) can be rewritten, using (2) and (4), as
CS(x) =
1
2
x′Mx, or (53)
in the case of symmetric CPs, from (66) and (67),
CS(n) =
(
D
(n)
i
)2
η0(d− c) , (54)
CS(nn) =
(
D(nn)i
)2
η∗(d− c) (55)
Now, from (43) and (47) it easily follows that CS(nn) >
CS(n) iff
CS(nn) > CS(n) ⇐⇒ D0
d− c >
q∗
1−
√
η0
η∗
, (56)
which is the same condition as in (50)
Finally, from (50), (51), and (56) it follows that, in the
symmetric case,
Π(nn)c > Π
(n)
c ⇐⇒ CS(nn) > CS(n) =⇒ Π(nn)s > Π(n)s .
(57)
5. DOWNSTREAM INTEGRATION
In the previous sections, the CPs are assumed to act
independently from each other and from the SE. In this
section, we analyze the scenarios that arise when the SE
integrates downstream, that is, when the SE is integrated
with one CP and when the SE is integrated with both CPs.
We call these scenarios “vertical integration” and “industry
integration”, respectively.
The models analyzed in this section build on the
non-neutral model presented in Section 3, and on the
assumptions made there, that is, that the cross effects in
D1 and D2 are symmetric.
5.1. Vertical integration
First, the case where the SE integrates with CP2 is
analyzed. Given η(·) and the parameters D0i, di, c
and λ, CP1 and SE+CP2 interact strategically and non-
cooperatively in order to maximize their respective profits.
That is, CP1 will charge a price p1 so as to maximize
its profits Πc,1, and simultaneously SE+CP2 will charge
a side payment q and a price p2 so as to maximize its joint
profit
Π = Πs + Πc,2 = (λ+ q)D1 + (λ+ p2)D2. (58)
We search for a Nash equilibrium (p(vi)1 , p
(vi)
2 , q
(vi)) by
solving the optimization problems
max
p1
Πc,1 (59)
s.t. q ≤ p1,
0 ≤ D01 − d1p1 + cp2.
 (60)
and
max
p2,q
Π (61)
s.t. 0 ≤ p2,
0 ≤ D02 + cp1 − d2p2,
0 ≤ q.
 (62)
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in
Appendix B.2.
5.2. Industry integration
The case where the SE integrates with both CP1 and CP2
is now analyzed. Given η(·) and the parameters D0i, di, c
and λ, the SE+CP1+CP2 takes an optimal decision in order
to maximize its joint profits. That is, the SE+CP1+CP2 will
choose a side payment q and charge a couple of prices p1
and p2 so as to maximize its joint profit
Π = Πs + Πc,1 + Πc,2 =
(λ+ p1)D1 + (λ+ p2)D2. (63)
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We now search for the values (p(ii)1 , p
(ii)
2 , q
(ii)) that are the
solution to
max
p1,p2,q
Π (64)
s.t. 0 ≤ p1,
0 ≤ p2,
0 ≤ D01 − d1p1 + cp2,
0 ≤ D02 + cp1 − d2p2,
0 ≤ q.

(65)
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in
Appendix B.1.
6. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND
DISCUSSION
In this section, the results derived above analytically are
computed numerically and represented graphically in order
to gain insight in the different tradeoffs at stake, and
the results are discussed. In Section 6.1 the outcome for
each stakeholder is computed for the neutral and non-
neutral cases. Sections 6.2 and 6.3 analyze the incentives
for integration in the vertical integration and industry
integration cases, respectively.
6.1. Neutral vs. non-neutral cases
The outcome for each stakeholder is computed for the
neutral and non-neutral cases, and the influence of each
parameter is analyzed.
On the conditions C1 and C2. In Fig. 2, the domains
such that conditions C1 and C2 hold are represented as a
function of λ.
First, note that the graph represents the right-hand side
of each inequality in (50) and (51) as a function of the
parameter λ, and each pair of curves is generated with
a different value for the parameter η0. And second, the
represented range of λ complies with (32).
Note that C1 is indeed the most constraining condition
(as proved previously), since the threshold curve lies
above that of C2 for every value of η0. Also the graph
demonstrates that there is a wide range of values for
D0/(d− c) and λ such thatC2 holds butC1 does not, i.e.,
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C2(η0= 0.1)
C1(η0= 0.2)
C2(η0= 0.2)
C1(η0= 0.35)
C2(η0= 0.35)
Figure 2. Thresholds for conditions C1, and C2 to hold, for
η0 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.35.
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Figure 3. Πc, Πs and CS for neutral and non-neutral cases
(D0/(d− c) = 6, λ = 8)
where the SE is better off but both the CP and the users are
harmed with a non-neutral SE.
On the values of Πc, Πs and CS. In Fig. 3, the values
of Πc, Πs and CS are represented as a function of η0. The
values of the parameters are D0 = 30, d = 7, c = 2 and
λ = 8.
As expected from conditions C1 and C2 and the above
discussion of Fig. 2, for low values of η0, all stakeholders
are better off in the non-neutral case. As η0 increases, the
first stakeholders to be harmed are the users and the CPs,
while the SE remains as the only stakeholder to take profit
from the search bias for high values of η0.
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Figure 5. Prices and side payment in non-neutral and vertical
integration cases.
6.2. Vertical integration incentives
We are interested in assessing whether both the SE and
CP2 have any incentives to integrate, as modeled in
section 5.1. In Figs. 4 and 5 the parameters take the
following values: D01 = D02 = 30, d1 = d2 = 5, λ = 6
and η0 = 0.2. Following Section 3, and specifically (67)
in Appendix A.2, we define the degree of substitution
σ , γ2/(β1β2) = c2/(d1d2) [17], which measures how
substitutable contents provided by CP1 and by CP2 are,
ranging from 0 (independent contents) to 1 (perfect
substitutes). In our setting, c takes values between 0.5 and
4.9, so that σ varies from 0.01 to 0.97.
Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium profits of SE+CP2 (Π(vi)s +
Π(vi)c,2), covered in Section 5.1, and the sum of the
equilibrium profits of SE and CP2 under the non-neutral
case (Π(nn)s + Π
(nn)
c,2 ), covered in Section 3. For illustrative
purposes, the profits of CP1 (Π(nn)c,1 and Π
(vi)
c,1) are also
shown. Finally, the consumer surpluses for the non-neutral
case and vertical integration (CS(nn) and CS(vi)) are also
represented. Fig. 5 shows the equilibrium prices charged
by the CP1 and the CP2 in the two cases (p(nn)i and p
(vi)
i ).
The equilibrium price charged by the SE (q∗ and q(vi)) is
also represented.
First, Fig. 4 shows that Π(vi)s + Π
(vi)
c,2 is higher than
Π(nn)s + Π
(nn)
c,2 . Additionally, as far as the situation of CP2
is concerned, although Πc,2 is reduced, CP1 gets a larger
reduction in profits than CP2 when the vertical integration
of SE and CP2 takes place. Second, Fig. 5 shows that all
prices p1, p2, q are reduced when SE and CP2 integrates.
And that CP2 fixes a lower equilibrium price p(vi)2 than
the corresponding p(vi)1 . Third, as regards the users, Fig. 4
shows that CS(vi) > CS(nn). And finally, as σ increases,
the profits difference between the two cases—but also
the consumer surplus difference—gets smaller. We have
checked that similar observations are obtained when λ
and η0 are varied, and when D01, D02, d1 and d2 are
varied independently, departing from the above symmetric
scenario.
We may conclude that the SE and the CP2 have
incentives to integrate. When the contents from each CP
are close substitutes, these incentives get reduced, and in
the limit, SE and CP2 are indifferent between integrating
or not.
6.3. Industry integration incentives
We are now interested in assessing whether the SE and
the two CPs have any incentives to integrate, as modeled
in section 5.2. In Figs. 6 and 7 the parameters take the
same values as in the previous subsection. Fig. 6 shows
the overall profits (Πs + Πc,1 + Πc,2) for the non-neutral
(Π(nn)), vertical integration (Π(vi)) and industry integration
(Π(ii)) cases. Accordingly, the consumer surplus in each
of the three cases (CS(nn),CS(vi),CS(ii)) is also represented.
Fig. 7 shows the values for the prices charged by the CP1
and the CP2 in each case. The side payment charged by the
SE is also represented.
First, Fig. 6 shows that, as expected, Π(ii) is greater than
Π(vi) and Π(nn) (note that SE+CP1+CP2 always has the
option to choose the prices that match either Π(vi) or Π(nn)).
Additionally, the relationship between CS(nn),CS(vi),CS(ii)
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Figure 7. Prices and side payment in non-neutral, vertical
integration and industry integration cases.
is different in each of the following three intervals:

CS(ii) > CS(vi) > CS(nn) if σ < σth1 ,
CS(vi) > CS(ii) > CS(nn) if σth1 < σ < σ
th
2 ,
CS(vi) > CS(nn) > CS(ii) if σth2 < σ.
Furthermore, as σ increases beyond σth2 , the profits
advantage in the industry integration case increases with
respect to the other two cases. Analogously, the consumer
surplus deterioration also increases beyond σth2 . Second,
Fig. 7 shows that the equilibrium price p(ii)i charged by the
CPs increases beyond the prices charged in the previous
two cases.
We have also checked that similar observations are
obtained when λ and η0 are varied, and whenD01,D02, d1
and d2 are varied independently, departing from the above
symmetric scenario.
We may conclude that the three operators have always
an incentive to integrate. And that the incentives, for a
degree of substitution σ larger than a threshold, become
very large. Note that when contents are close substitutes,
the benefit that the operators get from cooperation—i.e.,
from avoiding competition—is greater than otherwise. On
the other hand, the users will be worse off when contents
are close substitutes.
7. STACKELBERG MODEL
In previous sections, we assumed that both CPs and the
SE choose their respective prices in a simultaneous way. In
this section, we model a situation where the SE chooses the
side payment q, and the CPs, knowing this value, choose
their respective prices p1 and p2. This game model is of
a sequential-move type, it involves two stages and it is
commonly known as Stackelberg model [20]. We argue
that it is realistic that the SE, which is to some extent
providing an upstream or wholesale service to the content
providers, posts its price, and then the CPs, which are
providing a retail service to the users, post their respective
prices with the knowledge of the SE’s price.
In this section, we describe the Stackelberg model for
the non-neutral cases and the vertical integration cases.
Note that the Stackelberg model does not apply to neither
the neutral case—since there is no side payment to post—
nor to the industry integration case—since there is only one
player.
We have produced numerical results for the profits
and the consumer surplus, using the same parameters
as in Section 6, and we have checked that there is a
negligible difference between the simultaneous-move and
the Stackelberg models. Thus, no graphics is represented
for the Stackelberg model.
7.1. Stackelberg model for the non-neutral case
As in Section 3, each of the two CPs and the SE interact
strategically and non-cooperatively in order to maximize
their respective profits. That is, each CPi will charge a
price pi so as to maximize its profits Πc,i, and the SE will
charge a side payment q so as to maximize its profits Πs.
However, in this Stackelberg model, the SE posts the side
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payment q in a first stage, and, in a second stage, each CP
chooses simultaneously its respective price p1 and p2, with
the knowledge of q. Formally, the equilibrium concept here
is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium [20]. We denote
the equilibrium values (p(nns)1 , p
(nns)
2 , q
(nns)).
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in
Appendix B.3.
7.2. Stackelberg model for the vertical
integration case
As in Section 6.2, CP1 and SE+CP2 interact strategically
and non-cooperatively in order to maximize their
respective profits. That is, CP1 will charge a price p1 so
as to maximize its profits Πc,1, and SE+CP2 will charge
a side payment q and a price p2 so as to maximize its
joint profit Π = Πs + Πc,2 However, in this Stackelberg
model, the SE+CP2 chooses the side payment q in a
first stage, and, in a second stage, CP1 chooses its price
p1 and simultaneously SE+CP2 chooses p2, with the
knowledge of q. Again, the equilibrium concept here is
the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We denote the
equilibrium values (p(vis)1 , p
(vis)
2 , q
(vis)).
The detailed derivation of the solution is given in
Appendix B.4.
8. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed the interaction of a search engine and
two content providers when the former exhibits a non-
neutral behavior consisting in receiving a side payment in
exchange for a search service improvement. We have also
analyzed the incentives for the three operators to integrate,
and the effect the integration would have on the users.
We have analyzed a model where the pricing decisions
are taken simultaneously by every agent, that is, search
engine and content providers. Additionally, we have
analyzed an alternative model where the search engine
posts first its side payment and then each one of the other
agents, where applicable, chooses its price; and we have
checked that the solutions differ in a negligible amount.
As regards the analysis of the non-neutral behavior, we
conclude that under certain conditions, a side payment by
the content provider to the search engine is beneficial for
all stakeholders, since:
• the users are better off, which means that the
improvement achieved by the increase in the
likeliness to find the content compensates for the
increase in the content price: more users “see” the
content, and despite the fact that the price increases,
the number of subscribers increases;
• the content providers benefit from a better visibility,
allowing it to increase the subscription price to
cover the payments to the search engine;
• and the search engine benefits from the increase in
either the demand or the side payment, or in both.
Note that this win-win situation depends on the
characteristics of the user demand, through the maximum
tolerable price over the population; on the quality of the
search activity; and on the fraction of SE profits that
depends on the users demand but is independent of the side
payment. As we have seen, for this situation to occur, it is
required that:
• users be willing to pay a sufficient amount for the
service,
• without side payments, the SE gets a sufficient
revenue out of user demand for content,
• the visibility of the content in the neutral situation
is low enough.
When this win-win situation is not achieved, the users and
the CPs are the first stakeholders to suffer from non-neutral
search activity.
The above results would support, absent this win-win
situation, what the search engine neutrality advocates
claim: that ex-ante regulatory measures should be put in
place, i.e., side payments should not be allowed.
As regards the analysis of the different integration
scenarios, we conclude that:
• There is an incentive for the SE and one CP to
integrate; and the users would be better off if the
integration took place.
• The SE and the two CPs are better off when they
all integrate. However, when the contents provided
by the CPs are close substitutes, the users are worse
off in this situation, compared to the cases where the
SE does not integrate and where the SE integrates to
one CP.
These last results would support that ex-post regulatory
measures should be adopted so as to avoid the overall
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integration of the upstream SE and the downstream
CPs. Actually, the removal of entry barriers and
a non-discriminatory side payment—the one assumed
throughout the paper—would suffice, since any attempt by
the industry to integrate would be threatened by an entrant
CP which would drive the industry integration scenario to
one of vertical integration.
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A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UTILITY
AND DEMAND PARAMETERS
A.1. Neutral case
The relationship between the parameter set α1, α2, β1, β2,
γ, used in (1), and η0, D01, D02, c, d1, d2 in (7)–(8) can
be obtained from (5), as follows,
S =
1
η0
M−1, (66)
and [
D01
D02
]
=
1
η0
M−1α.
A.2. Non-neutral case
In a similar fashion, the relationship between the
parameter set α1, α2, β1, β2, γ, used in (1), and
η(q), D01, D02, c, d1, d2 in (23) can be obtained from (5),
as follows,
M−1 = η(q)S, (67)
and [
D01
D02
]
=
1
η(q)
M−1α.
Note that M depends on q, and thus it is different from the
one in the neutral scenario.
B. DETAILED SOLUTIONS
B.1. Industry integration Nash equilibrium
Let us refer as S to the set defined by the constraints
in (65). It is evident that Π(p1, p2, q) is continuously
differentiable on S.
Also, it is easy to check that η(q), and thus also Π as a
function of q, is decreasing for q > 1− 2η0. Therefore, we
can choose a value qu > 1− 2η0 such that if we add the
restriction q ≤ qu to those in (65) they define a compact
set; let us refer to this set as S ′.
Furthermore, if (p1, p2, q) ∈ S r S ′ we have that
Π(p1, p2, q
u) > Π(p1, p2, q).
Consequently, the maximum of Π on S ′, which is
guaranteed to exist, is also maximum of Π on S. Thus,
the point (p(ii)1 , p
(ii)
2 , q
(ii)) will be among those that satisfy
the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions of the problem
in (64)–(65).
We next present the solutions of the KKT conditions.
First, let us define
λ1 =
d2D01 + cD02
d1d2 − c2 , (68)
λ2 =
cD01 + d1D02
d1d2 − c2 , (69)
λ′1 =
D01
d1 − c , (70)
λ′2 =
D02
d2 − c , (71)
and assume, without any loss of generality, that λ′1 ≤ λ′2.
Then, it easily follows that λ′1 ≤ λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤ λ′2.
It can be shown there is only one point satisfying the
KTT conditions, which is therefore the global maximum.
Moreover, if the value of λ is low enough (as long
as condition (32) is met) the maximum is attained at
an interior point: p(ii)1 > 0, p
(ii)
2 > 0, q
(ii) > 0. Then, as λ
grows (while keeping the rest of the parameters constant)
the values of p(ii)1 and p
(ii)
2 decrease until, first, p1 = 0,
and second, p2 = 0. This behavior can be interpreted
as follows. When λ increases, it is more profitable to
lower the prices charged by the content since this raises
demand, and the increase in the profit from sponsored links
outweighs the profit loss from content. In the limit, if λ is
high enough, it is preferable not to charge at all for the
content and get all the profit from advertising.
The results obtained from the analysis of the KKT
conditions can be summarized as follows:
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• if λ < λ1 then p(ii)1 > 0 and p(ii)2 > 0[
p(ii)1
p(ii)1
]
=
1
2
S−1
[
D01
D02
]
− λ
2
[
1
1
]
; (72)
• if λ1 ≤ λ < λ′2 then p(ii)1 = 0 and
p(ii)2 =
D02 − λ(d2 − c)
2d2
;
• if λ′2 ≤ λ then p(ii)1 = p(ii)2 = 0;
• for all values of λ,
q(ii) = 1− 2η0. (73)
B.2. Vertical integration Nash equilibrium
With regard to the maximization of Πc,1 (see (59)), it can
be easily checked that, if the feasibility region is not empty,
that is if
D01 − d1q + cp2 ≥ 0, (74)
then the maximum is attained at
p1 =
1
2
(
D01 + cp2
d1
+ q
)
. (75)
Now we turn our attention to the maximization problem
for Π (see (61)).
We begin by noting that
lim
q→∞
Π = D01 − d1q + cp2 = D1
η(q)
and
(λ+ q)η(q) > 1 if q >
1− λη0
λ+ η0 − 2 .
By using these two observations, we can proceed in much
the same way as we did in B.1 so as to show that Π attains
a global maximum in the feasibility region defined by (62);
actually, in a compact subset of it.
From the analysis of the KKT conditions we obtained
that there are two types of candidates to be the maximum:
y(1) = (p
(1)
1 , p
(1)
2 , q
(1)) and y(2) = (p(2)1 , 0, q
(2)). The
first of them is an interior point, while for the second
p2 = 0. We now characterize each of the two solution
types.
Solution y(1). From
∂Πc,1
∂p1
=
∂Π
∂p2
= 0,
it follows that
[
p1
p2
]
= R
[
d1
c
]
q +R
[
D01
D02 − (d2 − c)λ
]
,
(76)
or with a simplified notation,[
p1
p2
]
=
[
A1
A2
]
q +
[
B1
B2
]
. (77)
The definition of A1, A2, B1, B2 is easily obtained by
comparing (76) and (77).
Substituting (77) into (23) yields
1
η(q)
[
D1
D2
]
=
[
E1
E2
]
q +
[
F1
F2
]
, (78)
where [
E1
E2
]
= −S
[
A1
A2
]
(79)
and [
F1
F2
]
=
[
D01
D02
]
− S
[
B1
B2
]
. (80)
Now, from ∂Π/∂q = 0,
(
(1− 2η0)λ+ η0 + (2− η0 − λ)q
) D1
η(q)
+
(p2 + λ)(1− 2η0 − q) D2
η(q)
= 0, (81)
and substituting (77) and (78) into (81) gives the following
cubic polynomial equation
a3q
3 + a2q
2 + a1q + a0 = 0, (82)
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where
a3 = −A2E2, (83)
a2 = (2− η0 − λ)E1 + (B2 + λ)E2+
(1− 2η0)A2E2 −A2F2, (84)
a1 = (λ+ η0 − 2λη0)E1 + (2− η0 − λ)F1+
(1− 2η0)(A2F2 +B2E2 + λE2)− (B2 + λ)F2,
(85)
a0 = (λ+ η0 − 2λη0)F1 + (1− 2η0)(B2 + λ)F2.
(86)
To get y(1) we first obtain q(1) by solving numeri-
cally (82), which is then substituted into (77) to obtain
(p
(1)
1 , p
(1)
2 ). Note that from the real roots of (82) we must
discard those that do not give rise to a feasible solution. In
other words, the obtained y(1) must satisfy the constraints
in (62) and (74).
Solution y(2) In the same way as above, we obtain that
p
(2)
1 =
1
2
(
D01
d1
+ q(2)
)
, (87)
p
(2)
2 = 0, (88)
and q(2) is a root of
b2q
2 + b1q + b0 = 0, (89)
where
b2 = d1(η0 + λ− 2) + λ, (90)
b1 = d1(λ+ η0 − 2λη0) +D01(η0 + λ− 2) +
λ(c
D01
d1
+ 2D02)− λ(1− 2η0), (91)
b0 = D01(λ+ η0 − 2λη0) +
λ(1− 2η0)(cD01
d1
+ 2D02). (92)
Now, we filter the roots of (89) by requiring y(2) to
satisfy
D01
d1
≥ q(2), (93)
λ >
D02 +
c
2
(
D01
d1
+ 3q(2)
)
d2 − c . (94)
The fact that if λ exceeds a certain threshold the
maximum for Π is attained at point where p2 has a similar
interpretation to that given in Sect. B.1.
Although we have not been able to establish this
mathematically, we conjecture that, for each set of values
of the parameters, the KKT yield exactly one feasible
candidate. That is, either there is one feasible solution of
type y(1) and none of type y(2), or vice versa. This has
been the case in all of our numerical experiments.
B.3. Solution of the Stackelberg model for the
non-neutral case
The maximization problems faced by CP1 and CP2 have
the same FOCs as in Section 3 (see (26)). From these we
obtain p1(q) and p2(q), that is, the price p1 (resp. p2) that,
for a given value of the side payment q, maximizes the
profit of CP1 (resp. CP2). We then substitute p1(q) and
p2(q) into the profit of the search engine, so that it becomes
a function solely of the variable q
Πs(q) = Πs(p1(q), p2(q), q).
The value q(nns) that maximizes Πs(q) is now sought by
solving the FOC Π′s(q) = 0, which after some algebra
becomes the cubic polynomial equation
q3 + 3q2 + a1q + a0 = 0, (95)
where
a1 = 2λ+ 2η0 − λη0 − b(λ+ η0 − 2) (96)
a0 = λη0 + b(2λη0 − λ− η0) (97)
and
b =
(2d1 + c)d2D01 + (2d2 + c)d1D02
2d1d2(d1 + d2 − c)− c2(d1 + d2) . (98)
We obtain q(nns) as the solution to (95) (after discarding the
roots that do not give rise to feasible solutions). Then the
prices charged by the CPs in the equilibrium are obtained
as p(nns) = p1(q(nns)) and p(nns) = p2(q(nns)).
In this subsection we have restricted to derive the
equations for the case in which the equilibrium is reached
at an interior point. The conditions for this to occur and
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the equations for the other cases can be derived in a similar
fashion as in B.1 and B.2.
B.4. Solution of the Stackelberg model for the
vertical integration case
Here we proceed in much the same way as in Sect. B.3.
From the FOCs we obtain the prices p1 and p2 as functions
of the side payment q; the expressions for p1(q) and p2(q)
are given in Eqs. (76) and (77). Then we substitute p1(q)
and p2(q) into the profit of SE+CP2, so that it becomes a
function solely of the variable q, Π(q). The value of q(vis)
is then obtained by solving the FOC Π′(q) = 0, which
becomes the cubic polynomial equation
a3q
3 + a2q
2 + a1q + a0 = 0, (99)
where
a3 = cA2 − d1, (100)
a2 = λ(c− d1)B2 + (η0 + 1)(cA2 − d1) +
(E1 + E2)(2− η0 − λ), (101)
a1 = λ(c− d1)(η0 + 1) + η0(cA2 − d1) +
(E1 + E2)(η0 + λ− 2η0λ) +
(F1 + F2)(2− η0 − λ), (102)
a0 = η0λ(c− d1)B2 + (F1 + F2)(η0 + λ− 2η0λ),
(103)
and E1, E2, F1, F2 are given in Eqs. (77)–(80). Finally,
q(vis) is the solution to (99) (after discarding the roots that
do not give rise to feasible solutions), and then p(vis) =
p1(q
(vis)) and p(nns) = p2(q(vis)).
As in the previous subsection, we have restricted to the
case in which the equilibrium is reached at an interior
point. The conditions for this to occur and the equations
for the other cases can be derived in a similar fashion as
in B.1 and B.2.
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